The Greek Cypriots said a firm 'no' to the Annan Plan in the 24th April referendum. But, will this end attempts to reunify Cyprus?
The results of the referendums on the Annan Plan[1] for reunification of the island of Cyprus, held on 24th April 2004, turned out much as expected. Voters in the south voted overwhelmingly ‘No’ while a majority in the north said ‘Yes’. As the campaign to sell the Annan Plan intensified, the international community’s former disapproval for TRNC vanished and the new ‘bad boys’ became those politicians in the south, Cyprus’s president Tassos Papadopolous in particular, who had urged his countrymen to vote no.
However, despite promises of increased aid and cooperation for the Turkish Cypriots from the US and Europe, there is limited room for manoeuvre as TRNC is an unrecognised state and there is no sign, as this report is written, of any change in its status. Similarly, it is difficult to see how the Republic of Cyprus can be effectively ‘punished’ as it is an economically successful state and now a member of the EU.
This does not mean that attempts are not being made to tarnish Cyprus’s reputation both economically and politically. Small-minded snubs were directed at Mr. Papadopolous, who attended a European gathering days later and, again, television commentary referred to the president’s pariah status during the celebrations held in Dublin on 1st May to welcome the 10 new accession countries. Despite recently declared support for the government in TRNC, disapproval of its president, Rauf Denktaş, remains undimmed.
In April 2003, Denktaş had refused to put the Annan Plan to a popular referendum in TRNC, kicking it into the long grass, so to speak, until the president was effectively sidelined when his supporters lost parliamentary elections in December 2003. He also refused to attend last minute talks held in Burgenstock, Switzerland, at the end of March 2004, which came up with the fifth and final version of the settlement agreement. He, too, urged his countrymen to oppose the Annan plan. However, whereas the republic’s ‘big brother’, Greece, took a hands-off approach to the issue, Ankara waded in and more or less demanded a ‘yes’ vote from the inhabitants of TRNC. Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayip Erdogan, had been assured favourable treatment when the country’s application to begin accession talks with the EU comes up for debate later in the year if he delivered the right result at the 24th April referendum.
Over the past 18 months, BHHRG has followed the agonising debates that led up to the collapse of the Annan Plan. During that time, they have visited both parts of the island of Cyprus to take the temperature of public opinion. In particular, they have concentrated on developments in the north where, following large demonstrations in January and February 2003, public opinion has shifted away from Mr. Denktaş’s rejectionist stance to a starry-eyed belief in the benefits of a negotiated settlement. The Group monitored the parliamentary elections in December 2003, in which the opposition won, although parties associated with Denktaş performed far better than anticipated. However, afterwards, Mr. Erdogan increased pressure on the north to deliver a ‘yes’ vote in the April referendum. As the state media in TRNC was now in the hands of the Annan Plan’s supporters, more waverers were won over in the five months leading up to the vote.
The Group’s report, Bitter Lemons: The Search for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem, published in July 2003[2], predicted that the major difficulty facing the Plan’s adoption lay in the hostile attitude of the inhabitants of the southern part of the island. The bottom line for the Greek Cypriots is the return of all their land and property which was expropriated by the Turkish Cypriots when they were expelled from the north of the island in 1974. They see no need to compromise as they consider that they have nothing to gain – they are prosperous as things are, on top of which, they are now members of the EU.
However, commentators regularly predicted that Mr. Denktaş was the stumbling block and little thought was given to the overwhelmingly rejectionist atmosphere in the south. The international community now faces a delicate balancing act whereby punishing the Greek Cypriots presents formidable problems from an influential and affluent diaspora as well as an unmentioned player – Russia. There is a significant body of Russian investors in Cyprus and the Russian Federation (which likely opposed the plan too) vetoed a UN resolution urging the parties to adopt it in the days leading up to the referendum, the first time the country had used its veto since 1994. Whatever transpires it is unlikely that matters will be allowed to rest there. There is talk of a new Annan plan, although the UN is being coy about any further involvement in the island’s affairs. In the absence of an agreement, Turkey is still likely to be rewarded with an invitation to begin negotiations on EU entry. Whether or not this benefits the people of Northern Cyprus remains to be seen. Despite all the pats on the back, TRNC is likely to remain marooned in isolation, dependent on Turkey, whose main concern now seems to be humouring the EU and US rather than supporting its kinsmen in Cyprus.
[1] http://unannanplan.agrino.org/Annan_Plan_MARCH_30_2004.pdf ,
[2] See, “Bitter Lemons: the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem” www.oscewatch.org.
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